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§ 1.1. Hearsay Exceptions-Dying Declarations and Prior Recorded 
Testimony.* It is the general rule in all courts of the United States that out-
of-court statements are inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of 
the matter stated therein.• This "hearsay" doctrine developed to encourage 
and to ensure the accuracy and reliability of testimony. 2 One reason that 
courts generally exclude hearsay statements is that since the out-of-court 
declarant does not speak under oath, he is not subject to any special induce-
ment, such as religious belief or fear of perjury, to speak the truth. 3 A sec-
ond reason is that because the declarant is not present at trial when making 
the statement, his demeanor cannot be evaluated appropriately by the trier 
of fact. 4 A third, and perhaps the most crucial, reason for the general hear-
say rule is the lack of any opportqnity for the adversary to cross examine the 
out-of-court declarant whose statements are reported at trial by another 
person or means.' Cross examination theoretically exposes the declarant's 
falsehoods, faulty perceptions, or lapses of memory. 6 It is generally agreed, 
therefore, that the unavailability of cross examination increases the 
likelihood of inaccurate and unreliable testimony. 7 
t William A. Fragetta, Janet L. Hoffman, Marjory D. Robertson. 
*By Marjory D. Robertson, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 1.1. ' See, e.g., City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 328, 30 N.E.2d 278, 295 
(1940). 
2 C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 245, at 581 (2d ed. 1972 & 1978 
Supp.) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. 
' /d. § 245, at 582. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Emerson, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 174, 176 (1856); Com-
monwealth v. Starkweather, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 59, 60 (1852); Lund v. Tyngsborough, 63 
Mass. (9 Cush.) 36, 40 (1851). See generally, 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1362, at 10 (Chard-
bourn rev. 1974 & 1981 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. 
• McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 245, at 582. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474, 495 (1951); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-3 (1895), quoted with ap-
proval in, Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965). Personal presence at trial may 
also be important insofar as it eliminates the danger of inaccurate reporting of the witness' 
statements. McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 245, at 582. Written hearsay statements, however, are 
not subject to this danger because they can be produced in court and tested for genuineness. /d. 
' McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 245, at 583; WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1362, at 10. See, e.g., 
cases cited at note 3 supra. 
• McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 245, at 583. 
' See, e.g., McClesky v. Leadbetter, 1 Ga. 551, 555 (1846). See also McCoRMICK, supra note 
2, § 245, at 583. 
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Despite the general rule that hearsay statements are inadmissible, many 
exceptions to the rule have developed over the years. 8 Courts have allowed 
exceptions where a need for the hearsay statements exists9 and where a cir-
cumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness of the testimony can be demon-
strated.10 During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court examined 
two widely recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. In Commonwealth v. 
Key, 11 the Court considered the dying declarations exception, and in Com-
monwealth v. Meech, 12 it discussed the prior recorded testimony exception. 
Both cases involved criminal prosecutions for homicide, 13 and in both cases 
the declarants were deceased at the time of trial. 14 If the trials had been civil 
proceedings, the hearsay statements of both wit~esses would have been ad-
missible by statute since both witnesses were deceased at the time of trial. 15 
Despite these and other similarities between the two cases, the Court's treat-
ment of the two hearsay exceptions varied significantly. 
Commonwealth v. Key-The Dying Declarations Exception. An excep-
tion to the hearsay rule known as the dying declaration is well-embedded in 
the common law of Massachusetts16 and of other states. 17 Courts have long 
held that a statement regarding the manner in which the declarant met his death · 
is admissible, provided: that it is offered in a prosecution for homicide18 
• See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Johnson, 299 F. 93, 98 (1st Cir. 1924). See also 
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., Ltd., 286 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1961); 
De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 894 (N.D. Cal. 1961); FED. R. Evm. 
803, 804. 
• See, e.g., Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 332-33, 19 N.W.2d 552, 559 (1945). See text 
and notes at notes 23 & 83 infra. 
10 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Smazer, 151 Conn. 226, 232, 196 A.2d 432,435 (1963). See text and 
notes at notes 24 & 84 infra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1551, 407 N.E.2d 327. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1065, 403 N.E.2d ll74. 
" Key, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1551, 407 N.E.2d at 329; Meech, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1065, 403 N.E.2d at ll76. 
14 Key, 1980 Mass.. Adv. Sh. at 1552, 407 N.E.2d at 330; Meech, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1065, 403 N.E.2d at ll76. 
" Mass. G.L. c. 233, § 65. 
16 Commonwealth v. Bishop, 165 Mass. 148, 152, 42 N.E. 560, 561 (1896); Commonwealth 
v. Roberts, 108 Mass. (12 Browne) 296, 301 (1871); Commonwealth v. Casey, 65 Mass. (ll 
Cush.) 417, 421-22 (1853). 
" WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1430, at 275-76; McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 281, at 680. 
" WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1431-32, at 277-79; McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 283, at 
681-82. The origin of this requirement appears to be the misconstrued words of a treatise 
writer. East, 1 Pleas of the Crown 353 (1803), quoted in WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1431, at 
277-78. Mr. East discussed the dying declarations exception as it applied in homicide cases but 
demonstrated no intent to limit its use to such proceedings. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1431, at 
277 n.4. In Massachusetts, Mass. G.L. c. 233, § 64 allows the introduction by the prosecution 
of the dying declarations of a woman dying from an abortion. See Commonwealth v. Viera, 
329 Mass. 470,472-73, 109 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1952). Also G.L. c. 233, § 65 allows the introduc-
tion in civil judicial proceedings of all declarations by a deceased person. No similar statute ex-
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committed upon the declarant; 19 that the declarant believed20 at the time of 
making the statement that he would die imminently; 21 and, that the 
declarant did in fact die shortly thereafter. 22 The rationale for the exception 
is attributed, in part, to necessity-since the witness has died, he is 
unavailable and, therefore, cannot be heard unless his dying declarations 
are admitted. 23 Furthermore, these statements, made under an impression 
of impending death, are considered trustworthy and reliable because the ap-
proach of death is viewed as creating a state of mind free from all ordinary 
motives to misstate. 24 Despite the relative ease of application of the stand-
ards for admitting dying declarations, courts and legislatures recently have 
criticized many of the doctrine's limitations as arbitrary. 2S 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth 
v. Key, 26 considered the dying declarations exception to the hearsay rule. In 
particular, the Court addressed four aspects of this exception. First, the 
Court discussed the standards to be used by the trial court judge in 
evaluating the admissibility of a dying declaration. 27 Second, it commented 
ists with respect to criminal prosecutions. Commonwealth v. Dunker, 363 Mass. 792, 794 n.1, 
298 N.E.2d 813, 815 n.1 (1973). 
" WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1433, at 281; McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 283, at 682. See text 
and notes at notes 55-62 infra. 
20 McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 282, at 680-81. This requirement entails that the declarant be 
alert and conscious of his injuries and of his approaching death. Commonwealth v. Haney, 127 
Mass. 455, 457 (1879). 
21 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1440-41, at 292-95; McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 282, at 
680-81. The belief must be in the certainty, not the probability, of impending death. Com-
monwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 497, 193 N.E. 68, 69 (1934). See text and notes at notes 
45-54 infra. 
22 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1431, at 276; McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 283, at 681. 
23 McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 283, at 681; WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1431, at 276. 
" WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1438, at 289. A theological belief by the declarant may not be 
required where the trustworthiness rationale is explained as either human awe at the approach 
of an unknown future or the Jack of any motive to issue self-serving statements immediately 
prior to death. /d. § 1443, at 302. Despite the assumed reliability of dying declarations, their 
admissibility has been limited to homicide cases. See note 18 supra. McCormick explains this 
limitation as the result of judges' beliefs that dying declarations are a kind of testimony that is 
likely to be handled too emotionally by the jury. McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 283, at 682. 
Therefore, courts desired to curtail the use of these statements. See text and note at note 75 in-
fra. Nevertheless, the reliability of dying declarations even in homicide cases may be dimin-
ished by the declarant's feeling of hatred or revenge. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1443, at 
302. 
" See, e.g., Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468,470-74, 138 P. 625,626-27 (1914). In Thurston, 
the court overruled the limitation of the admissibility of dying declarations to cases involving 
criminal prosecutions for homicide on the grounds that " '[t)he sanction of a dying declaration 
is equally efficacious whether it speaks of a murder or a robbery or a fraudulent will; and the 
necessity being the same the admissibility should be the same.' [quoting] 2 Wigmore on Ev. 
§ 1436." /d. at 474, 138 P. at 627. See also WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1436, at 286-89. 
26 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1551, 407 N.E.2d 327. 
27 /d. at 1553-54, 407 N.E.2d at 330-31. 
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upon the nature and extent of evidence required to demonstrate that the 
declarant had abandoned all hope of recovery. 28 Third, the common law 
rule that a dying declaration is admissible only in a prosecution for 
homicide committed upon the declarant was examined by the Court. 29 
Finally, the Court applied the standard to be used by the judge in instruct-
ing the jury on the weight to be accorded the dying declaration. 30 
The Key Court's analysis focused upon the dying declarations made by 
one of two victims allegedly murdered by the defendant. 31 In an explosion 
and fire at an apartment, firefighters had found the declarant and another 
victim with their hands and feet bound with wire. 32 They were taken to a 
hospital where one victim died a few hours later and the declarant died early 
the next morning. 33 While the declarant was in the hospital, he made several 
incriminating statements to the effect that the defendant had tied the two 
victims, poured gasoline on them and set them afire. 34 After being found 
guilty of murder in the first degree, the defendant appealed, challenging 
both introduction of the statements and the judge's instructions to the jury 
regarding the statements. 35 
In his appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, 36 the defendant alleged four 
errors regarding the trial court's disposition of the dying declarations issue. 
First, he argued that the trial judge had employed an improper standard in 
his preliminary finding of admissibility. 37 The defendant pointed to the jury 
instructions as an example of this error. 38 The defendant claimed that the 
" Id. at 1555-57, 407 N.E.2d at 331-32. 
" ld. at 1557-58, 407 N.E.2d at 332-33. 
" Id. at 1558-59, 407 N.E.2d at 333. 
" /d. at 1552, 407 N.E.2d at 330. 
" !d. at 1551-52, 407 N.E.2d at 330. 
" ld. at 1552, 407 N.E.2d at 330. 
,. ld. 
" ld. at 1551-53, 407 N.E.2d at 329-30. 
" The defendant appealed pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1551, 407 
N.E.2d at 329. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1553, 407 N.E.2d at 330. In Massachusetts, the judge makes a 
preliminary finding of admissibility but the jury is entitled to overrule it. See note 38 infra. 
" The Massachusetts courts follow the so-called "humane rule," which gives the defendant 
a second opportunity to have a dying declaration, already found admissible by the judge, to be 
excluded from the jury by allowing the jury to override the judge's preliminary finding of ad-
missibility. Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 498-99, 193 N.E. 68, 70 (1934). In 
Polian, however, the Court refused to require the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could 
give no weight to the dying declaration unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt the 
preliminary facts necessary to make it admissible./d. at 498, 193 N.E. at 70. The Court stated 
that "[e]very necessary element of the crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but it 
does not follow that every piece of evidence must be admissible beyond reasonable doubt." Id. 
The Massachusetts rule has been criticized as being less, not more, humane than the tradi-
tional view under which the judge resolves the question of admissibility. In Morgan, The Law 
of Evidence 1941-1945, 49 HARv. L. REv. 481 (1946), Professor Morgan commented: 
The courts which favor making the jury in effect a court of review of the judge's find-
4
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instructions revealed the judge's belief that even if the declarant had re-
tained a hope of recovery, the dying declaration exception would operate to 
admit his statement. 39 A further manifestation of the trial judge's adoption 
of an improper standard, the defendant contended, was that the judge did 
not make a finding that the declarant had abandoned all hope and lacked 
even the slightest expectation of recovery. 40 The Supreme Judicial Court re-
jected the defendant's arguments with respect to the judge's findings and to 
his jury instructions. 41 Examining the instructions42 and the findings as a 
whole, the Court concluded that the trial judge "obviously appreciated that 
'consciousness of ... certain doom' is the sine qua non of admissibility.' ' 43 
ing, do so on the theory that they are favoring the accused by giving him a second 
tribunal. Whether this will not operate to make the trial judge more liberal, if not more 
careless, in passing on the preliminary issue since he must later submit it to the jury if he 
allows them to hear the evidence, is at least open to debate .... Thus, an illogical at-
tempt to give the accused an added benefit may be but a step in a process of subtracting 
from what he already enjoys. 
ld. at 488-89. See also Quick, Some Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J. 109, 129 
(1960). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1554 n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 331 n.l. Specifically, the defendant relied 
upon the following comments by the judge to the jury: 
"And when I say convinced, I don't mean beyond all possibility, because we all know 
that a person, although he's pretty certain, he's sure that he's going to die, could always 
have a hope that he's going to live. But that's not what we're talking about. Did the man 
rationally, reasonably feel in his own heart, in his own mind, 'I'm going to die'?" 
Id. The defendant argued that this statement clearly revealed the standard upon which the 
judge relied in determining admissibility. ld. 
" The judge made the following findings regarding the declarant's state of mind at the time 
of the declaration: 
"I am satisfied that he was under the impression, turned out to be right, that his chances 
of living were minimal at the time when he made these statements to Sergeant Whalen.'' 
"Fobbs [the declarant] knew he was about to die imminently." "Fobbs understood that 
he wasn't going to make it past morning." "Fobbs had been informed and understood 
that death was imminent and inevitable as most things are." "Fobbs knew that his 
death was imminent." "Fobbs knew about and was certain that he was about to die in a 
short time." 
ld. at 1553, 407 N.E.2d at 331. 
" ld. at 1554 and n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 331 and n.l. 
" The Court concluded that the defendant must demonstrate substantial prejudicial harm 
for the judge's error in giving the instructions to be reversible because the defendant made no 
objections and took no exceptions to the judge's standard as employed in the judge's charge to 
the jury./d. at 1554 n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 331 n.l. See also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 21, 38, 399 N.E.2d 460, 471 (1980). Accordingly, the Court determined that the in-
structions must be viewed as a whole in evaluating whether substantial prejudice occurred. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1554 n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 331 n.l. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1554, 407 N.E.2d at 331 (quoting Shephard v. United States, 290 
U.S. 97, 100 (1933)). In particular, the Court noticed the judge's statements to the jury when 
they requested additional instructions: 
"Now we all realize that all of us may have some hope for a miracle. That's not what 
we're talking about. He's got to be convinced that he's going to die ... at the time he 
5
Fragetta et al.: Chapter 1: Evidence
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
6 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW § 1.1 
Specifically, the Court explained that the trial judge's allowance for a hope 
of a miracle on the declarant's part was not an incorrect interpretation of 
the law, because such hope is not the equivalent of an expectation of 
recovery. 44 Thus, in the Court's view, the trial judge's allowance was not a 
dilution of the traditional standard governing the admissibility of state-
ments under the dying declaration rule. 
The defendant next argued that the evidence in the case did not support 
the finding of the judge and the jury that the declarant had abandoned all 
hope of recovery. 4 ' The defendant relied specifically upon the declarant's 
only transcribed statement, taken the afternoon after the fire, wherein the 
declarant did not directly acknowledge that he was about to die. 46 The 
Court rejected the defendant's claim, reasoning that the declarant need not 
explicitly state that he has abandoned every hope of recovery47 and that ap-
prehension of impending death may be inferred from surrounding circum-
stances. 48 A police officer, a nurse, and a doctor all had told the declarant 
that he would die within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. 49 The Court con-
cluded that the declarant's replies to these statements, intimating accept-
ance, indicated that he had abandoned all significant hope of recovery. ' 0 
The declarant's refusal to acknowledge expressly his impending death in 
response to explicit questions,. was consistent, according to the Court, with 
abandoned hope, since a person who knows that he is about to die charac-
teristically will attempt to comfort those around him. 52 In addition, the 
Court reasoned that testimony given by several individuals who had seen the 
declarant prior to his death was a proper aid in determining the declarant's 
condition and attitude. 53 Finally, the seriousness of injuries sustained ty the 
declarant, his awareness of them, and his response to the death of his fellow 
makes the statement." 
ld. at 1554 n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 332 n.l. 
•• Id. at 1554 n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 331 n.l. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1555, 407 N.E.2d at 331. 
•• Id. at 1555, 407 N.E.2d at 331. In particular, the following exchange took place: 
"The sergeant: Do you think you are going to come through this all right, do you think 
you are going to live? The declarant-: I feel okay. . . . The sergeant: You heard the nurse 
say you have a fifty-fifty chance, do you think you are going to make it? (No answer.) 
The sergeant: Louis, I'll see you in a couple of days? The declarant: All right. What 
does the house look like up there?" 
Id. at 1555 n.2, 407 N.E.2d at 331 n.2 (emphasis supplied) . 
., Id. at 1555, 407 N.E.2d at 331-32. See Commonwealth v. Vierra, 329 Mass. 470, 473, 109 
N.E.2d 171, 173 (1952). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1555, 407 N.E.2d at 332. 
•• ld. at 1555-56, 407 N.E.2d at 332. 
'
0 Id. at 1556, 407 N.E.2d at 332. 
" See note 46 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1556, 407 N.E.2d at 332. 
" Id. Two doctors, two nurses, and a police officer observed the declarant and concluded 
that he realized that he was about to die. Id. 
6
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victim were sufficient, in the Court's opinion, to justify both the trial 
judge's and the jury's findings that the declarant had abandoned all hope of 
recovery. S4 
The third challenge brought by the defendant in Key focused upon the ad-
missibility of the declarant's statement in the defendant's trial for the 
murder of the non-declaring victim. 55 The defendant claimed that the judge 
should have instructed the jury to limit their consideration of the 
declarant's dying declarations to the issue of the declarant's homicide and 
not that of the other victim. 56 The Court dismissed the defendant's 
challenge, rejecting the common law rule that a dying declaration is ad-
missible only if the declarant is the person whose death is the subject of the 
charge. 57 The Court noted that the issue of admissibility of a declarant's 
statements in an indictment charging the murder of a fellow victim was a 
question of first impression in Massachusetts. 58 It then relied upon decisions 
by the Louisiana 59 and South Carolina courts60 in rejecting the common law 
rule as arbitrary and irrational. 61 In upholding the trial court judge's admis-
sion of the declarations to prove both murders, the Court emphasized that 
the judge had recognized the probable trustworthiness of the declarant's 
statements and commented that the statements did not become less 
trustworthy when offered to prove a fellow victim's murder. 62 
Finally, the defendant argued that the judge should have instructed the 
,. Id. at 1556-57, 407 N.E.2d at 332. 




" State v. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558, 559-60 (1871). In Wilson, the appellate court affirmed 
the trial judge's admission of the dying declaration of a wife who was shot at the same time as 
her husband, even though the defendant was being tried for the husband's and not the wife's 
murder. I d. at 559. Despite the court's rejection of the common Jaw rule in this case, in a later 
case, State v. Simon, 131 La. 520, 59 So. 975 (1912), the same court appeared to endorse the 
rule that a dying declaration is admissible only if the declarant is the person whose murder is 
being tried. Id. at 526-28, 59 So. at 977-78. The issue was not squarely raised in this case; never-
theless, the court proffered acceptance of the common law rule and cited State v. Wilson in 
support thereof. Id. at 528, 59 So. at 978. 
•• State v. Terrell, 46 S.C.L. (12 Rich.) 321 (1859). In Terrell, the court upheld the admissi-
bility of the statements of a declarant who had died of the same poison taken at the same time 
as the person whose murder was the subject of the indictment. Id. at 329-31. 
61 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1557-8,407 N.E.2d at 333. The Court noted that some states have 
reworked the common Jaw through judicial decision or legislative action. Id. at 1557 n.3, 407 
N.E.2d at 333 n.3. The Court also cited Commonwealth v. Stallone, 281 Pa. 41, 44-46, 126 A. 
56, 57-58 (1924) as support for its rejection of the common law rule. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1558, 407 N.E.2d at 333. The Court's reliance upon Stallone apears misplaced, however, since 
the court in that case expressly endorsed the common Jaw rule. 281 Pa. at 44-45, 126 A. at 
57-58. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1558, 407 N.E.2d at 333. 
7
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jury to receive the dying declarations with caution. 63 The Court concluded 
that the trial judge was not required to charge the jury in this manner and 
that he was not expected to expound extensively upon "the niceties of the 
hearsay rule per se. " 64 Rather, the Court reasoned, pursuant to the 
"humane rule" followed in Massachusetts, 6 ' the trial judge only had to in-
struct the jury on the preliminary facts that they must find before consider-
ing any of the declarant's statements as dying declarations. 66 The Court 
held that the judge had satisfied this standard in that he had instructed the 
jury repeatedly that, despite the legal theory supporting the trustworthiness 
of dying declarations in general, the truth of the specific statement in the 
case at bar remained a jury question. 67 Since charging the jury is a discre-
tionary function of the trial judge, 68 and since the defendant could show no 
abuse thereof, the Court refused to reverse. 69 
The Court's treatment of the initial determination of admissibility and 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that the declarant had 
abandoned all hope of recovery was justified by judicial precedent. 70 The 
declarant died shortly after making the statements, 71 thereby indicating 
both the seriousness of his injuries and his probable state of mind. Further-
more, the declarant never took any actions inconsistent with a belief in im-
pending death. Indeed, his tendency to become reflective and his request to 
telephone his grandfather were highly indicative of an overriding sense of 
doom. 72 Although the Court did not stress these facts in its resolution of the 
issue, such behavior by the declarant supports the Court's conclusion that 
the common law standard had been met. 73 Therefore, the Court's disposi-
tion of this issue was consistent with the common law requirement of an 
63 /d . 
•• /d. 
" See note 38 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1558, 407 N.E.2d at 333. 
" /d. Specifically, the judge told the jury: " '[Y]ou don't have to believe anybody.' "He 
also explained that the jury "might consider whether Fobbs was 'competent to say what [he 
allegedly) said' and whether he answered questions 'in a manner that showed he knew what he 
was saying.' " /d. (brackets original). 
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roberts, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1302, 1320, 389 N.E.2d 989, 
998. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1558-59, 407 N.E.2d at 333. 
70 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 496-500, 193 N.E. 68, 69-71 (1934); 
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 373 Mass. 45, 50-51, 364 N.E.2d 1224, 1227-28 (1977). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1552, 407 N.E.2d at 330. Speediness of death is required, but 
periods extending into several weeks or months have been held not too long. McCORMICK, 
supra note 2, § 282, at 681. Cf. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 495, 497 (1862) 
(the issue is not the length of interval between the death and the declaration but the state of the 
declarant's mind at the time of making the declaration). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1555, 407 N.E.2d at 332. 
" See also People v. Gonzales, 87 Cal. App. 2d 867, 879, 198 P.2d 81, 89 (1948). 
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acknowledgment of impending death and an abandonment of all hope of 
recovery. 
The Court's treatment of the defendant's challenges regarding the ad-
missibility of these declarations was supported, as well, by policy considera-
tions behind the hearsay rule and its exceptions. Rejection of the common 
law rule limiting the admissibility of dying declarations to cases involving a 
homicide on the declarant is supported by many commentators. 74 At com-
mon law, however, courts have not allowed the admission of a dying 
declaration in a prosecution against the defendant for the homicide of a vic-
tim other than the declarant on the ground that absolute necessity was not 
present. 75 Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court in Key and other courts 
rejecting the common law rule76 have recognized that the need and reliabili-
ty of these dying declarations outweighs this technical limitation. All 
statements of a person now deceased are admissible in civil proceedings in 
Massachusetts. 77 Thus, the expansion of the admissibility of dying declara-
tions in criminal prosecutions for homicide to encompass a situation where 
the defendant is being tried for the murder of both the declarant and 
another victim of the same homicide is hardly an unwarranted dilution of 
the hearsay rule. 
The Court's decision to abolish the common law rule limiting a dying 
declaration's admissibility to cases involving a homicide on the declarant, 
was, however, probably gratuitous in Key. Challenges of the common law 
rule have been considered only in cases where the defendant was not actual-
ly charged with the murder of the declarant. 78 No courts prior to Key had 
considered the rule where both murders-the declarant's and the fellow vic-
tim's-were subjects ofthe charges in the prosecution. Therefore, the Court 
easily could have confined its rejection of the common law standard to the 
narrow situation in Key where the defendant is being tried for the homicide 
of both the declarant and the other victim. 79 The Court's choice to abolish 
74 
·see, e.g., S WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1433, at 281 n.l (calling the limitation "crass 
stupidity") and 282; McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 283, at 682. 
" See, e.g., State v. Bohan, IS Kan. 407, 418 (1875). In Bohan, the court commented that 
dying declarations are: 
not received upon any other ground than that of necessity, in order to prevent murder 
going unpunished .... Its admission can be justified only on the ground of absolute 
necessity, growing out of the fact that the murderer, by putting the witness, generally 
the sole witness of his crime, beyond the power of the court by killing him, shall not 
thereby escape the consequences of his crime. 
ld. at 418. 
76 See, e.g., Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 470-74, 138 P. 625, 626-27 (1914). 
" G.L. c. 233, § 65. 
71 See, e.g., Westberry v. State, 175 Ga. 115, 117, 164 S.E. 905, 907 (1932). See also cases 
cited inS WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1433, at 281-82 n.l. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1551, 407 N.E.2d at 329. 
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the common law requirement entirely is, nevertheless, a significant step 
towards the elimination of an arbitrary standard surrounding the ad-
missibility of dying declarations. 
The Key Court's overall analysis of the dying declaration exception to the 
hearsay rule was, accordingly, thorough and justifiable. The facts 
surrounding the making of the statements by the declarant were well within 
the ambit of the exception as it has developed in Massachusetts and in other 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Court perceived that the trial judge's treat-
ment of the issue displayed neither carelessness nor misapprehension of the 
law. Finally, the Court's total rejection of the common law requirement 
that the declarant's murder be the subject of the homicide charge was con-
sonant with the growing trend80 to eliminate the limitations surrounding the 
dying declaration exception. 
Commonwealth v. Meech-The Prior Recorded Testimony Exception. 
As hearsay principles have developed, courts in Massachusetts 81 and in 
other statesu have allowed, as an exception to the general hearsay rule, the 
introduction of prior recorded testimony of a witness, provided that certain 
requirements are satisfied. The rationales for admitting prior recorded 
testimony are the necessity of receiving the testimony83 and the trustworthi-
ness of testimony given under oath. u Under the common law, the party at-
tempting to introduce either a written transcript" or an oral report86 of the 
former testimony of a witness must demonstrate that five conditions are 
fulfilled. 87 First, the party must demonstrate that the former testimony was 
given under the sanction of oath. 18 Second, the witness must now be 
•• See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1436, at 287-89 and n.4. 
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 499-500, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1184-85 
(1977); Commonwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 492-93, 233 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1968). 
" See, e.g., Gaines v. Thomas, 241 S.C. 412, 415-18, 128 S.E.2d 692, 694-96 (1962); Lone 
Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 308, 153 S.W.2d 681, 697 (1941); George v. Davie, 201 
Ark. 470,472-73, 145 S.W.2d 729, 730-31 (1940). See also McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 254 at 
614-16. 
" McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 255, at 617. 
14 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,, 804(b)(1)(03), at 804-62 (1979 & 
1980 Supp.). 
" Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 328-29, 175 N.E. 718, 722 (1931). 
•• Commonwealth v. Glassman, 253 Mass. 65, 74, 147 N.E. 833, 835 (1925); McGivern v. 
Steele, 197 Mass. 164, 165, 83 N.E. 405,405 (1908); Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18 
Pick.) 434, 437-40 (1836). 
" McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 255, at 616-17; § 266, at 617-20; § 257, at 620-22. 
" See Ibanez v. Winston, 222 Mass. 129, 130, 109 N.E. 814, 814 (1915); McCORMICK, supra 
note 2, § 255, at 616 & n.1S. Although the party attempting to introduce the former testimony 
has been required to make an affirmative showing that an oath was administered and the 
witness sworn, Monahan v. Clemons, 212 Ky. 504, 507-08, 279 S.W. 974, 975 (1926), other 
courts maintain that evidence that the witness testified justifies an inference that he was sworn. 
See, e.g., Keith v. State, 53 Ohio App. 58, 72, 4 N.E.2d 220, 226 (1936). 
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unavailable. 89 Third, the party against whom the testimony is being offered 
must have had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witness when 
the testimony was given. 9° Fourth, there must be an identity of parties be-
tween the litigation at which the testimony was given and the one at which it 
is offered as evidence. 9 ' Finally, there must be substantial identity between 
the issues at the earlier and pending proceedings. 92 The thrust of these re-
quirements is that the party against whom the testimony is offered must 
have had an adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness about the 
issues for which the testimony is being introduced. 93 In recent years, many 
of the requirements of this hearsay exception have been criticized as out-
moded because they are reflections of an earlier period when there were no 
court reporters. 94 Commentators also have urged that testimony given 
under the sanction of oath is intrinsically more reliable than statements ad-
mitted pursuant to some of the other hearsay exceptions and, therefore, 
should not be subject to burdensome limitations. 9 ' 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth 
v. Meech, 96 addressed several issues relating to the admission of prior 
recorded testimony. In Meech, the defendant was charged with murdering 
the victim by cutting his throat. 97 ·At trial, the defendant claimed that the 
" Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 499-500, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (1977); Mc-
CoRMICK, supra note 2, § 255, at 617. 
9° Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 500, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1185; McCoRMICK, 
supra note 2, § 255, at 616-17. Actual cross examination at the prior trial is not required; never-
theless, the party attempting to introduce the testimony must demonstrate that the party 
against whom it is being offered had an adequate opportunity to exercise the right to cross ex-
amine if desired. Canon, 373 Mass. at 500, 368 N.E.2d at 1185; State v. Roebuck, 75 Wash. 2d 
67, 72, 448 P.2d 934, 938 (1968); McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 255, at 616. 
,., Warren v. Nichols, 47 Mass. (6 Met.) 261, 264 (1843). The requirement of identity of par-
ties has been exanded in two ways. First, the condition includes a successor in interest to the 
corresponding party in the original suit. Yale v. Comstock, 112 Mass. (16 Browne) 267, 268 
(1873); McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 256, at 618 and n.32. Second, some courts have held that 
only the party against whom the former testimony is now offered need have been the same. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 500, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (1977); Bryant 
v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 411 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); McCoRMICK, supra 
note 2, § 256, at 618 and n.35. Wigmore has advocated that the identity of parties test be 
satisfied where the cross-examining party at the former proceeding had the same interest and 
motive in cross-examining the witness as the present party against whom the testimony is of-
fered. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1388, at Ill. 
92 Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494 500, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (1977); McCOR· 
MICK, supra note 2, § 257, at 620-22. 
" McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 255, at 616, § 257, at 620. See text and notes at notes 5-7 
supra for a discussion behind the importance of an adequate opportunity to cross examine. 
9• See, e.g., McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 261, at 625-26. See the requirements in text at 
notes 88-92 supra . 
., See, e.g., id. § 261, at 625-27. 
96 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1065, 403 N.E.2d 1174 (1980). 
97 /d. at 1065, 403 N.E.2d at 1176. The murder allegedly occurred after the defendant had 
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former testimony of a witness, now deceased, given at a grand jury pro-
ceeding should be admitted. 98 The witness had testified before the grand 
jury that he had encountered the defendant, who was covered with blood, 
shortly after the alleged murder. The witness further had stated that he and 
the defendant had shared some beer together at this time, that the defendant 
had threatened the witness with a knife, 99 and that the defendant had made 
homosexual advances towards him. 100 The defendant sought to introduce 
the witness' testimony to demonstrate that the defendabt had lacked 
criminal responsibility at the time of the homicide. 101 The trial court judge 
denied the defendant's request to submit the testimony to the jury .102 After 
being found guilty of murder in the first degree, the defendant appealed. 103 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant claimed that the 
former testimony should have been admitted under either the prior recorded 
testimony exception 104 or an "innominate" exception to the hearsay rule. 10 ' 
been drinking with the victim and arguing with him about money earlier in the day. ld. at 
1065-66, 403 N.E.2d at 1176. 
91 ld. at 1065, 403 N.E.2d at 1176. 
99 This knife was allegedly the murder weapon. ld. at 1068, 403 N.E.2d at 1177. 
100 The Court also remarked that the witness had testified that he then fled the room yelling 
" 'Meech, [the defendant) you're loony.' "Id. at 1068 n.4, 403 N.E.2d at 1177 n.4. The Court 
concluded that even if the remainder of the witness' testimony was admissible, this statement 
could be excluded. This statement would be inadmissible because persons " 'having no 
peculiar skill or professional experience, can testify only to facts within their own knowledge, 
from which the condition of mind may be inferred, and are not permitted to state whether in 
their opinion, though derived from personal observation, a certain person was sane or insane 
at a particular time.' " Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 447, 99 N.E. 266, 270 
(1912), (quoting Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. (3 Browne) 622, 624-25 (1868)) cited in 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1068 n.4, 403 N.E.2d at 1177 n.4. 
101
. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1068, 403 N.E.2d at 1177. In particular, the testimony would be 
used to demonstrate his callousness or indifference after the alleged murder. Id. The defendant 
did not, however, deny committing the murder. Id. at 1065, 403 N.E.2d at 1176. 
10
' Id. at 1065, 403 N.E.2d at 1176. 
103 Id. The defendant appealed pursuant to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G and Mass. R.A.P. 1B 
(effective July 1, 1979). 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1065, 403 N.E.2d at 1176. 
10
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1068, 403 N.E.2d at 1177. See text and notes at notes 107-21 in-
fra. 
10
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1071, 403 N.E.2d at 1179. See text and notes at notes 122-29 in-
fra. The defendant urged two additional grounds for admission that were dismissed summarily 
by the Court. He suggested that the witness' former testimony should have been admitted 
through one of his experts who relied upon it in reaching his conclusions about the defendant's 
mental condition. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1070-71, 403 N.E.2d at 1178. The Court dismissed 
this challenge on the ground that an expert's use of hearsay to form an opinion does not render 
the hearsay admissible. ld. at 1071,403 N.E.2d at 1179. See, e.g., Wing v. Commonwealth, 
359 Mass. 286, 290, 268 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1971). Compare FED. R. Evm. 703 and 705 which 
provide, respectively, that an expert may base his opinion upon hearsay evidence and that the 
expert may be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. See also, 
McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REv. 463, 
481-82 (1977). 
12
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The Court rejected both of the defendant's challenges.' 06 As to the first 
argument, the Court began its analysis with a discussion of the scope of the 
prior recorded testimony exception in Massachusetts. It reasoned that such 
testimony is admissible where it was given by a person, now unavailable, in 
a proceeding that addressed substantially the same issues as the pending 
proceeding and that provided a reasonable opportunity and similar motiva-
tion for cross examination by the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered. 107 Where these conditions are met, the Court explained, 
Massachusetts courts have allowed testimony from one criminal trial, ' 08 and 
from a preliminary hearing, 109 to be admitted at subsequent criminal trials. 
The Court distinguished Meech from these situations, however, on the 
ground that the prosecution was presenting the testimony of the witness at 
the grand jury hearing on direct examination." 0 The Court, accordingly, 
reasoned that the state was not in the position of cross-examiner at the hear-
ing.''' Nevertheless, the Court noted that certain commentators '' 2 and some 
courts" 3 have concluded that a party tendering the testimony on direct has 
The defendant also suggested that a similar account of the witness' encounter with the 
defendant, given to the police by the witness before the grand jury hearing, 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1068,403 N.E.2d at 1177, should have been admitted under the business records excep-
tion. Id. at 1071 n.lO, 403 N.E.2d at 1179 n.IO. The Court concluded that the judge did not err 
in refusing this suggestion. ld. See Kelly v. O'Neill, 1 Mass. App. 313,316-17,296 N.E.2d 223, 
225-26 (1973). 
106 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1068-73, 403 N.E.2d at 1177-80. 
107 Id. at 1068-69, 403 N.E.2d at 1177. 
101 Id. at 1069,403 N.E.2d at 1177. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 363 Mass. 467,470, 
295 N.E.2d 163, 165-66 (1973). The Court also has allowed testimony from a civil trial to be in-
troduced at a later criminal trial. Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 500, 368 N.E.2d 
1181, 1185 (1977). 
109 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1069, 403 N.E.2d at 1178. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caine, 
366 Mass. 366, 371-72, 318 N.E.2d 901, 906 (1974). 
110 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1069,403 N.E.2d at 1178. Although the issue was not raised, the 
Court remarked that the grand jury testimony would not be admissible against the defendant 
under the prior recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule since the defendant did not 
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. !d. at 1069, 403 N.E.2d at 1178. The Court 
also addressed in a footnote the possible violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right of 
confrontation that would result if the testimony were admitted against him. Id. at 1069 n.5, 
403 N.E.2d at 1178 n.5. But see United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 939 (1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978). 
111 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1069, 403 N.E.2d at 1178. 
112 See, e.g., McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 255, at 617; see generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,, 804(b)(l)[03), at 804-63-64 (1979 & 1980 Supp.). 
113 See, e.g., Dwyer v. State, 154 Me. 179, 183-85, 145 A.2d 100, 102-03 (1958). Cf. Com-
monwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 501, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (1977) ("We do not think the 
Court intended to lay down an absolute requirement of actual cross-examination as well as 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination .... "). See also FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(l) which 
provides: 
"(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
13
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an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. 114 Therefore, under this 
theory, the government should be considered bound to the trustworthiness 
of the evidence it chose to present to the grand jury. ll s 
Having raised these arguments, the Court chose not to indicate its posi-
tion with respect to the admissibility, under this hearsay exception, of prior 
testimony given on direct examination. 116 Instead, it rejected the 
defendant's invocation of the prior recorded testimony exception on an 
independent ground. The Court reasoned that the witness' testimony in 
Meech was of "dubious acceptability,"ll' regardless of the distinction be-
tween direct and cross examination, because the substantial identity of 
issues requirement 118 of this hearsay exception was not satisfied. 119 The 
Court noted that the prosecution's purpose in examining the witness before 
the grand jury had been to provide eyewitness proof about the defendant's 
possession of the murder weapon. 120 Since the defendant at trial sought to 
introduce the testimony as evidence of his criminal irresponsibility, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the evidence was properly excluded. 121 
The defendant's second claim was that the witness' former testimony 
should have been admitted under an "innominate" exception to the hearsay 
rule applicable in federal courts. 122 The defendant referred to Rule 804(b)(5) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows hearsay statements not 
covered by any specific exception to be introduced where the statement is 
reliable and is probative on a material fact. 123 The Court noted that such a 
I d. 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of 
the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, 
or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." 
,. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1069-70, 403 N.E.2d at ll78. 
'" ld. at 1070,403 N.E.2d 70 at ll78. See United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D. 
N.J. 1978); United States v. Driscoll, 445 F. Supp. 864,866-67 (D. N.J. 1978); Commonwealth 
v. Shagoury, 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 927,940, 380 N.E.2d 708,716 (1978) (assumption 
of admissibility). 
'" Indeed, the Court indicated nonacceptance of the view that the presentation of testimony 
on direct would satisfy the requirement of an adequate opportunity for cross examination: 
"[The prior recorded testimony exception] is [not) nominally fulfilled where, as here, the 
defendant offers the testimony against the Commonwealth, for the Commonwealth ... was 
presenting the testimony through direct examination." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1069, 403 
N.E.2d at ll78. 
'" Id. at 1070, 403 N.E.2d at ll78. 
'" See text and note at note 92 supra. 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1070, 403 N.E.2d at ll78. 
120 ld. 
'" ld. 
122 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1071, 403 N.E.2d at ll79. 
12
' Under the heading "Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable;" FED. R. Evm. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/4
§ 1.1 EVIDENCE 15 
rule had not yet been adopted in Massachusetts, but admonished that "we 
do not regard the common hearsay exceptions as frozen in their established 
contours." 124 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the Federal Rule was 
inapplicable to the witness' grand jury testimony for two reasons. First, the 
Court explained that the application of the innominate exception is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court judge. 125 Thus, the Court determined 
that reversing a conviction for the judge's failure to admit hearsay would be 
inappropriate in light of the trial judge's familiarity with the evidence. 126 
Second, the Court noted that the hearsay should not be admitted unless it is 
" 'more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.' " 127 
In this case, the Court reasoned, other evidence presented by the defendant 
was equally if not more probative of the defendant's criminal irresponsibil-
ity, or indifference, at the time of the alleged homicide. 128 Thus, the Court 
804(b)(5) reads in relevant part: 
I d. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the 
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general pur-
poses of these rules and interests of justice will best be served by admission of the state-
ment into evidence. 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1072,403 N.E.2d at 1179. See also Commonwealth v. White, 370 
Mass. 703, 713, 352 N.E.2d 904, 911 (1976). 
"' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1072, 403 N.E.2d at 1179. 
126 Id. Although the Court did not stress this point, the defendant did not assert the in-
nominate exception at the trial court level. ld. at 1071, 403 N.E.2d at 1179. The Court, 
however, did rely upon a case, Solomon v. Dabrowski, 295 Mass. 358, 359-60, 3 N.E.2d 744, 
744-45 (1936), which emphasized that the objecting party must inform the judge specifically of 
any limitations or deficiencies in the judge's determination in order to ensure careful and 
orderly progression of the case and to avoid confusion and unfairness to the opposing parties. 
Id. The defendant's failure to assert this exception at trial, therefore, necessarily reduced the 
scope of review available to the Court. 
"' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1072, 403 N.E.2d at 1179 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5)(B)). 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1072, 403 N.E.2d at 1179. The Court relied upon the following: 
"his drinking beer with bloodied hands after the event; leaving the knife in open view; 
making no effort to clean up before calling a cab to his sister's house, or for some time 
after arriving there." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court also noted in a footnote that the trustworthiness of the 
witness's testimony was questionable because the defendant never mentioned the encounter 
with the witness in accounts that the defendant gave of the crime and subsequent actions. 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1072 n.12, 403 N.E.2d at 1179 n.12. Thus, the Court suggested that insuffi-
cient corroboration existed for the testimony to be introduced. Id. Although the Court cited 
cases requiring extensive corroboration, the Court's reliance upon these cases was misplaced. 
See United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1143, 1146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 
(1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135-36 (4th Cir. 1978). Both of these cases in-
volved grand jury testimony offered by the government against the defendant wherein the 
15
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concluded that any error that may have been committed by the trial court 
judge in excluding the testimony was insignificant since it barred only 
cumulative evidence. 129 
The Court's interpretation of the requirements of both exceptions was ex-
tremely narrow, though correct. As to the prior recorded testimony excep-
tion, the Court properly noted that there was not a substantial identity of 
issues between the grand jury proceeding and the later trial since the prose-
cution obviously had no need or desire to examine the witness at the grand 
jury hearing concerning the defendant's defense of criminal irresponsibility. 
Indeed, the prosecution may not have known, at that time, that the defend-
ant intended to assert this defense. 
In light of the policies behind the hearsay rule and its exceptions, how-
ever, the Court could have admitted the testimony to salvage the now-
deceased witness' observations, notwithstanding the absence of a precise 
similarity between the issues at the two proceedings. Such admission would 
not substantially prejudice the prosecution. The testimony of the witness 
was given at the grand jury under oath and, therefore, arguably was more 
trustworthy than out-of-court statements admitted under other hearsay ex-
ceptions.130 Furthermore, the witness had reported a similar account of the 
events to the police a month and a half before the grand jury proceeding. 131 
In addition, the prosecution already had used the witness' grand jury testi-
mony to connect the defendant with the alleged murder weapon. 132 There-
fore, the prosecution had had at least a minimal opportunity to assess the 
defendant neither had the opportunity to cross-examine nor actually cross examined the 
witnesses. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1143; West, 574 F.2d at 1134. The admission of this testimony 
against the defendants thus involved a possible violation of their sixth amendment right of con-
frontation. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1146; West, 574 F.2d at 1136-37. 
No issue of the constitutional right of confrontation was raised, however, in the Meech case. 
In addition, the prosecution did examine the witness at the grand jury hearing. 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1070, 403 N.E.2d at 1178. Indeed, the prosecution specifically relied upon the 
witness's testimony at the hearing, id., thereby indicating its belief in the declarant's credibil-
ity. Finally, the witness had given a similar account of the encounter with the defendant a 
month and a half before the grand jury proceeding. /d. Since the prosecution actually exam-
ined the witness and since some corroboration existed, substantial guarantees of the trust-
worthiness of the witness' testimony existed. Although the Court stated that the defendant had 
never mentioned the encounter, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1072 n.12, 403 N.E.2d at 1179, n.12, 
the defendant's trustworthiness was not at issue. Rather, the deceased witness's reliability was 
questioned. Accordingly, this discrepancy should hav.e affected the weight, not the admissibil-
ity, of the statements. Furthermore, the defendant's failure to mention the encounter with the 
witness in accounts that the defendant gave of the crime should not affect the admissibility of 
the witness' statements if the prosecution is allowed to impeach the defendant. See Common-
wealth v. West, 312 Mass. 438, 440, 45 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1942). 
129 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1073, 403 N.E.2d at 1180. 
130 See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 261, at 626. 
131 See note 128 supra. 
132 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1070, 403 N.E.2d at 1178. 
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reliability of the witness. Other exceptions to the hearsay rule frequently 
provide no opportunity for the party against whom the testimony is in-
troduced to examine in any manner the declarant's reliability or trust-
worthiness.'33 
Although the Meech Court refused to accept the assertion that the presen-
tation of testimony on direct satisfies the requirement of an adequate op-
portunity for cross examination, future practitioners could attempt to 
distinguish Meech on the ground that a substantial identity of issues could 
not be demonstrated. The Court itself, however, did not confine its decision 
to the particular facts of Meech. Indeed, the Court declined to indicate that 
the presentation of testimony on direct by any party, in any circumstances, 
would ever satisfy the requirement of an adequate opportunity for cross ex-
amination. 
The Court's treatment of the defendant's challenge under the innominate 
exception to the hearsay rule was narrower than its discussion of the prior 
recorded testimony exception. Since consideration of the innominate excep-
tion is a matter largely withn the discretion of the trial court judge, the 
Court's refusal to apply it to Meech was justified in light of the defendant's 
failure to assert this challenge to the trial court.' 34 If the defendant, 
however, had informed the trial court of this issue and then had reasserted it 
on appeal, the Court's conclusion would appear less justified. Although 
cumulative evidence existed, the Court improperly concluded that other 
evidence was presented that was equally probative of the defendant's 
callousness or indifference as it pertained to his defense of criminal ir-
responsibility. The grand jury witness' description of the defendant's 
behavior shortly after the alleged murder was the only eyewitness account 
of grossly callous behavior by the defendant. Although the defendant's 
sister also testified about an encounter she had with the defendant shortly 
after the homicide, her testimony did not provide substantial insight into his 
state of mind.' 35 Admission of the testimony of the grand jury witness, ac-
cordingly, may have been sufficient to create a reasonable doubt for the 
jury. 
"' McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 257, at 620. 
'" See note 126 supra. 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1066, 403 N.E.2d at 1176. Specifically, she testified that: 
the defendant, intoxicated and unruly, appeared at her apartment in North Billerica 
about 7 P.M. His clothes were stained with blood. He had arrived by taxi which heap-
parently had summoned from a bar near the murder scene. To McLaughlin [the defend-
ants's sister) and her friend Kenneth Moody, the defendant volunteered that he 'had cut 
[a) guy's throat.' Concerned about her children seeing the defendant in his dishevelled 
condition, McLaughlin urged the defendant to clean himself, which, after a while, he 
did. He washed and changed and told Moody to burn his discarded clothes. Instead, 
Moody placed them in a back hall outside the apartment. The defendant fell asleep 
about 10:30 P.M. and did not awaken until3 A.M., just before the arrival of the police. 
17
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Conclusion. The Court's treatment of challenges to the prior recorded 
testimony exception in Meech and the dying declarations exception in Key 
appear inconsistent. In both cases, the hearsay statements of witnesses 
deceased at the time of trial were offered as testimony in prosecutions for 
homicide. 136 In Massachusetts, all statements of a person now deceased are 
admissible by statute in civil proceedings. 137 In light of this liberal statutory 
policy, the Court should not be overly reluctant to allow minor expansions 
of the admissibility of statements by persons now deceased under certain 
hearsay exceptions in criminal proceedings. In Key, the Court was willing to 
undertake a gratuitous expansion of the scope of the common law dying 
declarations exception. In Meech, however, the Court declined to indicate 
any support for a similar expansion of the prior recorded testimony excep-
tion. Although differences between the criminal and civil judicial process 
might warrant stricter standards of admissibility in criminal trials, the situa-
tion involved in the Meech case did not warrant such a conclusion. The 
defendant, and not the prosecution, was attempting to introduce the prior 
recorded testimony and, therefore, no constitutional right of confronta-
tion 138 was involved. Furthermore, the declarant had spoken under oath, 
had already reported a similar account of his encounter with the defendant, 
and had been examined by the prosecution on direct at the grand jury pro-
ceeding. This combination of factors supporting trustworthiness compen-
sates for any variations between civil and criminal trials. Nevertheless, the 
Court may have been willing to extend the dying declarations exception and 
not the prior recorded testimony exception because the dying declarations 
doctrine requires that the declarant actually be dead while the prior re-
corded testimony exception requires only unavailability. Expanding the dy-
ing declarations exception is, therefore, consistent with the liberal statutory 
policy of admitting all statements of a person deceased at the time of trial in 
a civil proceeding. In contrast, a similar broadening of the prior recorded 
testimony exception would affect the admissibility of statements by the liv-
ing as well as by the deceased. 
§ 1.2. Polygraph Evidence: Costs for Indigents Requesting Polygraph 
Examination.* In a 1974 case, Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court departed from its long-standing ban on the admissibility of 
polygraph2 evidence in criminal trials. In A Juvenile the Court adopted the 
ld. (Brackets of [a] in original). 
"' See notes 13 and 14 supra. 
"' Mass. G.L. c. 233, § 65. 
"' See note 128 supra. 
*By Janet L. Hoffman, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW. 
§ 1.2 ' 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974). For a general discussion ofthe admissibility 
of polygraph evidence in criminal proceedings, see Evidence, 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASS. 
LAW§ 4.1 at 81. 
' Polygraphy is the science of lie detection. The polygraph machine records a subject's 
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view that such evidence could be admitted at the discretion of the trial judge 
if the defendant had requested the examination3 and had agreed in advance 
that the results of the test would be admitted regardless of the outcome. 4 
Four years later, in Commonwealth v. Vitello,' the Court modified A 
Juvenile by defining the purpose for which polygraph evidence may be used 
in criminal trials and by eliminating the requirement that the defendant 
waive objections to admission of the results prior to taking the test. 6 In 
Vitello, the Court rejected the use of polygraph evidence as independent 
proof of either guilt or innocence and held that such evidence should be ad-
missible, at the discretion of the trial judge, for the limited purposes of cor-
roborating or impeaching the defendant's testimony.' A defendant who 
chooses to testify can call the polygraph examiner as an "expert character 
witness" on the issue of credibility. 8 
One issue not addressed by A Juvenile or Vitello is whether an indigent 
defendant would be allowed expenses for the cost of a polygraph examina-
tion. General Laws chapter 261, section 27C allows an indigent defendant 
"extra fees and costs" for documents or services reasonably necessary to 
assure him a defense as effective as that available to a defendant with ade-
quate financial resources. 9 Under this provision, a trial court must hold a 
hearing to determine whether a defendant is eligible for state funding of 
physiological responses to questions asked by a polygraph examiner. On the basis of these 
responses, polygraph experts claim to be able to tell whether the subject is lying or telling the 
truth. See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2603, 2609-17, 381 N.E.2d 582, 
586-89 (1978). 
' 365 Mass. at 430-31, 313 N.E.2d at 126. 
• /d. at 431, 313 N .E.2d at 126-27. The Court listed other safeguards in A Juvenile: (a) The 
defendant must be informed that he is waiving his fifth amendment right against self in-
crimination; /d. at 431-32, 313 N.E.2d at 127; (b) the waiver must be voluntary; /d. at 432, 313 
N.E.2d at 127 and (c) the polygraph examiner must be qualified, the defendant must be compe-
tent to take the examination, and the test must be administered properly. /d. at 425-27, 313 
N.E.2d at 124. 
' 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2603, 381 N.E.2d 582. The companion case to Vitello was Com-
monwealth v. Moynihan, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2654, 381 N.E.2d 575. 
• 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2637-39, 381 N.E.2d at 598-99. 
' /d. at 2632, 381 N.E.2d at 5%. 
• /d. at 2636, 381 N.E.2d at 598. 
• G.L. c. 261, § 27C, states in pertinent part: 
Court's Findings as to lndigency: Hearings; Posting of Notice of Indigency Limits . 
• • • 
(4) If the court makes a finding of indigency, it shall not deny any request with respect 
to normal fees and costs, and it shall not deny any request with respect to extra fees and 
costs if it finds the document, service or object is reasonably necessary to assure the ap-
plicant as effective a prosecution, defense or appeal as he would have if he were finan-
cially able to pay. The court shall not deny any request without first holding a hearing 
thereon; and if there is an appeal pursuant to section twenty-seven D following a denial, 
the court shall, within three days set forth its written findings and reasons justifying 
19
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"extra fees and costs."' 0 In a case decided during the Survey year, Com-
monwealth v. Lockley, 11 the Court interpreted General Laws chapter 261, 
section 27 for the first time. 12 Specifically, the Court set out the standards 
for deciding under what circumstances the expenses of a polygraph test 
would be covered by chapter 261, section 27C. 
In Lockley, the defendant was convicted of robbery.' 3 Prior to trial, he 
had filed a motion in the trial court to order a polygraph examination of 
himself, and to allow payment under General Laws chapter 261, section 27 
to cover the cost of the examination. 14 Both motions were denied.'' The 
court neither conducted a hearing to make an initial finding of indigency 
nor inquired into the desirability or necessity of a polygraph examination of 
Lockley, as required by General Laws chapter 261, section 27. The court 
reasoned that the purpose for which such evidence is admissible is too 
limited to justify the outlay of public funds for an indigent defendant to 
take the test.' 6 In denying the motions, the judge held that Vitello did not 
require state-financed polygraph examinations for indigent defendants. 17 
The judge stated that this outlay of public funds for the test would be 
''based on the bare possibility that in the event that they pass it then they 
can use it to enhance their credibility at the trial, and in the event that they 
don't pass it then it is not admissible ... [s]imply by their not taking the 
stand ... "' 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new 
trial.' 9 Noting that the case was one of first impression with respect to the 
such denial, which document shall be part of the record on appeal. 
G.L. c. 261, § 27C (1978 & 1981 Supp.). 
G.L. c. 261, § 27A defines "extra fees and costs" as: 
the fees and costs, in addition to those a party is normally required to pay in order to 
prosecute or defend his case, which result when a party employs or responds to a pro-
cedure not necessarily required in the particular type of proceeding in which he is in-
volved. They shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the costs of transcribing a 
deposition, expert assistance and appeals bonds, and appeal bond premiums. 
G.L. c. 261, § 27A. These provisions reflect amendments since the Lockley trial decision. The 
changes with respect to the provision cited above were minor. See G.L. c. 261; §§ 27A, 27C(4) 
(1978). 
10 See note 9 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1699, 408 N.E.2d 834. 
" /d. at 1703, 408 N.E.2d at 838. 
" /d. at 1699, 408 N.E.2d at 836. 
14 /d. at 1701, 408 N.E.2d at 837. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 1704, 408 N.E.2d at 838. The trial judge stated: "[a)s I read the Vitello case I just 
don't see where courts in any way should authorize those examinations, as far as I am per-
sonally concerned." /d. at 1701, 408 N.E.2d at 837. 
" Id. at 1702, 408 N.E.2d at 837. 
18 /d. 
" /d. at 1706-07, 408 N.E.2d at 840. 
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interpretation of General Laws chapter 261, section 27C, the Court deter-
mined that the defendant had not had a sufficient hearing on the issue, as 
required by that statute. 20 
In interpreting the statute, the Court observed that the standard for 
deciding whether to grant a request for "extra fees and costs" to an indigent 
defendant is one of reasonable necessity. 21 The Court pointed out that, 
under this standard, the test is not simply whether a defendant with 
unlimited resources would choose a particular item or service, or whether ~m 
item ''might conceivably" assist in the defense. 22 Nor must it be shown that 
the item or service "would necessarily change" the outcome of the case. 23 
Rather, in determining if an indigent is entitled to costs under chapter 261, 
section 27C, the Court stated, the aim is to prevent the indigent from suffer-
ing a disadvantage in the preparation of his defense, as compared with the 
preparation available to a paying defendant. 24 
In further defining this reasonable necessity standard, the Lockley Court 
suggested five factors that a trial judge may consider in deciding whether a 
request for a financed polygraph test should qualify under General Laws 
chapter 261, section 27C: 2 ' 
1. cost of the test; 26 
2. whether the requirements of admissibility defined in Vitello have 
been met; 27 
3. the limited use to which such evidence may be used at trial; 28 
4. whether the defendant has a criminal record which might deter him 
from testifying; 29 
5. the possibility that an unfavorable test would work to a 
defendant's disadvantage should he wish to take the stand. 30 
20 /d. at 1702-03,408 N.E.2d at 837-38. The Court noted that the defendant had not availed 
himself of the statutory appeal provision of c. 261, § 270. /d. Nevertheless, the Court pro-
ceeded to review the case since the trial judge had not informed Lockley of his right to appeal, 
as required by § 270, and because the Court wished to take this opportunity to construe the 
statute for the first time. Id. In a later case, the Appeals Court advised the bar that "we may 
conclude in some future case that the appeal provided for in G.L. c. 261, § 270, is the exclusive 
means of securing appellate review of a denial under§ 27C.'' Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 1980 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1911, 1914 n.10, 411 N.E.2d 483, 485-86 n.lO. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1703, 408 N.E.2d at 838. See note 9 supra for the statutory defini-




" /d. at 1706, 408 N.E.2d at 839. 
26 /d. 
" /d. See text and notes at notes 5-7 supra. 
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While the Lockley decision appears to be concerned primarily with the 
matter of costs, the Court, in setting forth the five factors, was not simply 
defining the criteria for determining indigent defendants' rights to extra fees 
and costs in connection with a defense. Rather, the Court made the accessi-
bility to indigent defendants of state-funded polygraph examinations 
dependent on whether the polygraph evidence could be used at trial. 31 In 
this sense, the determination with respect to costs in Lockley becomes sec-
ondary to the threshold question of admissibility. For example, by in-
cluding the second factor-that the Vitello requirements must be met-the 
Lockley Court reinforced the Vitello standard for procedural safeguards 
and the Vitello limitation on the purposes for which such evidence may be 
used. 32 Lockley, thus, incorporated the notion that polygraph results may 
be introduced only on the issue of a defendant's credibility, and only if the 
defendant chooses to take the stand. 33 Furthermore, by suggesting in the 
third and fourth criteria that a judge consider the limited use of polygraph 
evidence and the defendant's criminal record when applying chapter 261, 
section 27C, the Court reiterated the concerns it addressed in Vitello with 
respect to a defendant's decision whether to testify. In Vitello the Court 
held that admissibility of favorable polygraph results would encourage the 
innocent defendant with a criminal record to testify. 34 Suchitest results, the 
Court noted in Vitello, would tend to offset the impact of a defendant's 
criminal record. 35 Lockley reaffirmed this policy of encouraging defendants 
to testify by listing among the considerations the possibility that a prior 
criminal record might deter a defendant from testifying. 36 Thus, factors two 
through four incorporated the admissibility standards and the policy 
adopted in Vitello. 
By introducing the fifth factor, the Lockley Court raised a concern not 
resolved by the Vitello decision. Specifically, the Court considered whether 
the risk that an innocent defendant wishing to testify might be severely in-
hibited from taking the stand because of an unfavorable polygraph test 
result. 37 Since polygraphy is not considered infallible, 38 the innocent 
" /d. at 1705 n.3, 408 N.E.2d at 839 n.3. The Court noted that "lilt may be appropriate to 
observe that the accessibility of polygraph examinations to indigent defeqdants is another of 
the questions ... which a study of that general subject might be able to cortsider more broadly 
than is possible on the limited record in the present case." /d. In makin$ this comment, the 
Court referred to A Juvenile, Vitello and People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 
(1977), as cases containing a general discussion of the admissibility of polygraph evidence. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1705-06 n.3, 408 N.E.2d at 839 n.3. 
" 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2637-39, 381 N.E.2d at 598-99. 
" See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2637-38, 38l:N.E.2d at 598. 
,. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2637, 381 N.E.2d at 598. 
" /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1705, 408 N.E.2d at 839. 
" /d. at 1706, 408 N.E.2d at 839. 
" See Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 
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defendant with a prior criminal record still faces the possibility that the 
results will be unfavorable to him. 39 Vitello suggested that a voir dire hear-
ing prior to trial might serve to minimize the risk of an improperly ad-
ministered test, and that proper instructions to the jurors would advise them 
sufficiently of the limited purposes for which the results could be used. 40 As 
a practical matter, such precautions might not eliminate the possibilities 
either of inhibiting a defendant from testifying or of contributing additional 
unfavorable evidence against an innocent defendant who chooses to testify. 
Aside from the possible adverse effect on an innocent defendant, the 
Vitello-Lockley standard may provide a windfall to guilty defendants who 
otherwise would not take the stand. The standard leaves the decision of 
whether to introduce the test results in the hands of the defendant. 
Thus, a guilty defendant who does not have a history of prior convictions 
might decide that he has nothing to lose by taking the test at public expense 
on the chance that he might pass it. This is the concern that the trial judge in 
Lockley raised when he denied the defendant's request for a polygraph ex-
amination and for costs under General Laws chapter 261, section 27C. 41 
The Supreme Judicial Court avoided addressing this practical matter by 
basing its decision on statutory construction and the requirement that the 
trial judge hold a full hearing. 
In applying chapter 261, section 27C to polygraph examinations, then, 
the Lockley Court really addressed not the public funding aspect of the 
case, but, rather, the desirability of admitting polygraph test results. In do-
ing so, the Court appears to have stepped beyond the role of judicial discre-
tion and into the realm of trial strategy, an area more appropriately re-
served for counsel. Specifically, the Lockley decision seems to suggest that, 
in determining "reasonable necessity," the trial judge consider whether the 
defendant's criminal record might deter him from testifying and whether an 
unfavorable test might work to his disadvantage if he testifies. 42 This ap-
proach empowers a judge to make decisions that the defendant should make 
in consultation with his attorney. Even more disturbing is the notion that a 
YALE L.J. 694, 700 (1%1) where the author noted that "[l)ying can conceivably result in 
satisfaction, excitement, humor, boredom, sadness, hatred, as well as guilt, fear or anxiety. 
Not uncommon are pathological individuals who, for various reasons, believe in their lies or 
are unconcerned about them." This observation tends to undermine the reliability of 
polygraphy as an analytical tool. 
" Another notable distinction between A Juvenile and Vitello is that the earlier case suggests 
that a defendant could introduce the results of a lie detector test without taking the stand. 365 
Mass. at 425-26, 313 N.E.2d at 124. In Vitello, and, consequently, Lockley, the Court pre-
cluded such evidence unless the defendant chose to testify. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2637-39, 381 
N.E.2d at 598-99; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1704-05, 408 N.E.2d at 838-39. 
•• 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2639, 381 N.E.2d at 599. 
" See text and notes at notes 16-18 Sl'Dra. 
" See text and notes at notes 25-30 supra. 
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defendant might be compelled to reveal his intent to testify or not to testify 
at a pretrial chapter 261, section 27C, hearing. 
The novelty of admitting polygraph evidence no doubt explains the 
dearth of case law on the issue of public funding for polygraph examina-
tions. Courts in other jurisdictions that have reached this issue have defined 
the standards for allowing costs in terms of necessity and admissibility, as in 
Lockley. 43 This standard is not unlike the approach taken with respect to 
state funding for other types of experts for indigent defendants. 44 The 
parallel is not complete, however, because polygraphy does not yet enjoy 
the same general acceptability of other scientific disciplines. 45 
In Lockley, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that it would allow 
costs for polygraph tests under General Laws chapter 261, section 27C, to 
the extent that such evidence would be admissible. In linking such deter-
minations to the general subject of admissibility, the Court observed that 
further examination of polygraphy as an evidentiary tool may enter into 
later Court decisions concerning state funding for such tests under the 
statute. 46 Based on Lockley, the practitioner representing an indigent 
defendant can request a polygraph test at state expense and expect a hearing 
on the issues of indigency and "reasonable necessity" under chapter 261, 
section 27C. Lockley also indicates that defense attorneys can expect the 
court to play an active role in the defendant's decision to submit to a poly-
graph examination. Thus, proceeding with the matter of polygraph 
evidence, the practitioner would be well advised to review the Court's 
posture on polygraphy as an evidentiary tool, and to balance his client's re-
quest against the five admissibility-oriented factors suggested by the Court 
in Lockley. 
§ 1.3. Hypnotically-Aided Testimony-Admissibility at Criminal Trials.* 
Most jurisdictions neither allow a witness to testify while under hypnosis 
nor admit evidence of pretrial statements made by a hypnotized subject. 1 
While evidence elicited under hypnosis is held inadmissible, many jurisdic-
•• See U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (admissibility is a prime factor); 
State v. Acosta, 41 Or. App. 257, 587 P.2d 1282 (1979) Gudge's discretion); State v. Martinez, 
90 N.M. 595, 566 P.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1977) (defendant must show necessity); United States v. 
Penick, 4% F.2d 1105, 1109-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974) Gudge's 
discretion). 
•• In fact, the Massachusetts statute allowance for the cost of "experts" is explicitly con-
templated. See note 9 supra. 
•• This view was expressed in a 1979 Massachusetts Appeals Court case, Commonwealth v. 
Foley, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 999, 1003-04, 389 N.E.2d 762, 765-6(!. In Foley, the court 
noted that lie detectors and their operators cannot be treated equally with scientific methods 
and practitioners of more established fields./d. at 1704, 389 N.E.2d at 766. 
•• See note 31 supra. 
*By Janet L. Hoffman, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF Mt\SSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 1.3 ' See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979); 
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tions do not bar post-hypnotic statements that were developed as a result of 
hypnosis. 2 In fact, the most common use of hypnosis as a forensic tool in 
criminal cases is where a witness testifies after having had his memory 
refreshed through hypnosis. In this context, many courts view the hypnosis 
underlying a witness' testimony as a factor going to credibility, and not a 
matter of admissibility. 3 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth 
v. A Juvenile, 4 addressed the issue of whether the hypnotically-aided 
testimony' of a prosecution witness should be admissible at trial. In A Juve-
nile, a seventeen-year-old defendant was found delinquent as a result of 
numerous counts of rape and assault against a young woman. 6 After the 
assault, the victim, the sole eyewitness, was unable to identify her attacker 
accurately. 7 To assist in the identification process, a Boston police detective 
hypnotized her. 8 After the officer refreshed her memory through hypnosis, 
the victim was able to participate in the preparation of a composite sketch 
that led to charges against the juvenile9 and, later, to offer identification 
testimony at trial. 10 Both the composite sketch and the victim's testimony 
ultimately led to the finding of delinquency. 11 The juvenile appealed this 
finding through a motion to suppress the victim's identification testimony, 
claiming that the suggestiveness of the hypnotic procedure had tainted the 
evidence. 12 
The Supreme Judicial Court determined that it could not reach the issue 
of whether the hypnotically-aided evidence should be suppressed because 
People v. Hangsleban, 86 Mich. App. 718, 728-29, 273 N.W.2d 539, 544 (1978); Emmett v. 
State, 232 Ga. 110, 115, 205 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 
710, 715-16, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974). 
In one jurisdiction, statements made under hypnosis were allowed for the limited purpose of 
corroborating an expert opinion. See People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 732-33, 382 P.2d 33, 
39 (1963). But see State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P .2d 492 (1965) (value of corroborating ex-
pert opinion outweighed by danger of confusing the jury). 
' See, e.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 277 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372, 374-75 (Fla. 
App. 1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 112-13,244 S.E.2d 414,427-28 (1978); Harding v. 
State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). 
' See cases cited in note 2 supra. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2319, 412 N.E.2d 339. 
' The phrase "hypnotically-aided testimony" was used by the Court "to describe testimony 
that was not available from the hypnotized witness before hypnosis and became available from 
that witness after hypnosis." /d. at 2320 n.3, 412 N.E.2d at 341 n.3. 
' Report, Juvenile Court Dept., Boston App. Div. Nos. AD790199D-AD790211D at 1. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2319, 412 N.E.2d at 340. 
'/d. 
• /d. 
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the trial judge had not made crucial findings of fact concerning the reliabili-
ty of the identification testimony and the ''suggestibility'' of the procedures 
that were followed. 13 Therefore, the Court remanded the case for further 
findings. u Although it did not decide whether or under what circumstances 
hypnotically-aided testimony would be admissible," the Court identified 
several factors that may serve as a guide, should the question arise in future 
cases. 16 In doing so, the Court set forth the following considerations: (1) the 
suggestiveness of the hypnotic process both in a general and constitutional 
sense; 17 (2) the applicability of the "general acceptance" standard to hyp-
notically-aided testimony; 18 (3) procedures that might serve to minimize or 
, eliminate suggestiveness; 19 and (4) the evidentiary role to be played by the 
pretrial use of hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory. 20 
In discussing these matters, the Court reviewed the varied treatment of 
hypnotically-aided testimony in different jurisdictions. 21 The Court first 
observed that most jurisdictions bar both testimony given under hypnosis 
and statements made by a hypnotized subject prior to trial. 22 The Court 
" /d. at 2320-21, 412 N.E.2d at 341. 
,. !d. at 2326, 412 N.E.2d at 344. The juvenile initially had appealed to the Appellate Ses-
sion of the Boston Juvenile Court. The trial judge reported the following questions to the Ap-
peals Court: 
1. Whether the composite picture assembled by the witness on November 30, 1978, 
should be suppressed because her memory was enhanced by hypnosis, although she was 
not in an hypnotic trance when the composite was made (though there may be a ques-
tion of whether she was subject to posthypnotic suggestion). 
2. If there is no record of the hypnosis, is this a critical defect or may inferences be 
drawn about the absence of a record of the process. 
3. If the composite is to be suppressed, should the court admit the testimony concern-
ing the witness' later identifications of the defendant in a photograph and in person? 
Are these later identifications to be excluded as tainted? 
4. Should the fact that the police officer who administered the composite 'kit' knew the 
defendant from the past be considered 'unduly suggestive?' 
5. If the composite is to be suppressed, shall the court permit the witness to identify the 
defendant as her assailant in her testimony before the jury as an independent in-court 
identification? 
6. What if any standards should be followed by a trial judge in deciding whether to ad-
mit evidence which< is the product of a witness' hypnotically-enhanced recollection? 
7. Should the person who administers hypnosis have any defined training, background 
or education? 
/d. at 2320 & n.l, 412 N.E.2d at 340 & n.l. The Supreme Judicial Court took the case on its 
own motion. /d. at 2320, 412 N.E.2d at 340-41. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 2321, 412 N.E.2d at 341. 
" !d. at 2322, 412 N.E.2d at 341-42. 
" ld. at 2322-24, 412 N.E.2d at 341-43. 
" /d. at 2324-26, 412 N.E.2d at 343. 
20 /d. at 2321-22, 412 N.E.2d at 341. 
" /d. at 2321-25, 412 N.E.2d at 341-43. 
22 See note 1 supra. 
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noted one case, however, where statements made under hypnosis were ad-
mitted for the limited purpose of corroborating an expert opinion. 23 Turn-
ing to the specific treatment of hypnotically-aided testimony, the Court 
stressed that most jurisdictions admit this evidence and view the fact of hyp-
nosis as going merely to the credibility of the witness, rather than to the ad-
missibility of the evidence. 24 The Court noted that the most striking position 
among these jurisdictions is that of the Ninth Circuit, which held hypnot-
ically-aided testimony generally admissible without requiring consideration 
of the suggestiveness of the hypnotic process. 25 
Finally, the Court discussed a number of decisions that approached the 
admissibility of hypnotically-aided testimony by assessing the reliability of 
such testimony in terms of the "general acceptance" standard first stated in 
Frye v. United States. 26 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia held that for an expert opinion to be admissible, 
the principles upon which the opinion is based "must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which 
it belongs." 27 The Supreme Judicial Court, in A Juvenile, observed that 
jurisdicftons that have applied the Frye general acceptance standard to hyp-
nosis have produced varied results. For example, recent Minnesota28 and 
Arizona29 decisions have held hypnotically-aided testimony inadmissible 
because the procedure used fell short of ordinary standards of reliability as 
a scientific tool. 3° Conversely, the Court observed, a New Jersey trial court 
judge in State v. Hurd31 concluded that the Frye test was met to the extent 
that hypnotized subjects ''have the ability to concentrate on a past event 
and volunteer previously unrevealed statements concerning the event. " 32 
The Hurd court concluded, however, that the procedures used in the case 
did not meet the due process standards required by United States v. Wade 33 
and Neil v. Biggers. 34 The Hurd court based its conclusion on a finding that 
23 /d. 
24 See cases cited in note 2 supra. 
" See, e.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667, 669-70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
1006 (1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975). 
•• 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
27 /d. 
" State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980). 
" State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 550-52, 611 P.2d 551, 554-56 (1980). 
•• See cases cited at notes 28, 29 supra. 
" 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (1980), ajj'd, _N.J._, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). 
" 173 N.J. Super. at 361, 414 A.2d at 305. 
" 388 U.S. 218 (1%7). In United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States 
stated that the sixth amendment requires substantial procedural safeguards with respect to 
pretrial identification procedures. /d. at 228-32, 235, 236-39. 
,. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). In Neil v. Biggers, the Supreme Court applied a two-pronged test to 
determine the admissibility of p;·etrial identification evidence: (1) whether the procedures in-
27
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the state had failed to prove either that there was no impermissibly sug-
gestive conduct, or that the hypnotically-aided testimony was reliable under 
the "totality of circumstances. " 3 ' 
In contrast to Hurd, in A Juvenile, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that 
considerations surrounding the suggestiveness of pretrial identification pro-
cedures may bear no relevance to the admissibility of hypnotically-aided 
testimony. 36 Thus, A Juvenile suggests that the Supreme Judicial Court may 
adopt a different approach than that of Hurd. With respect to the ap-
plicability of the Frye general acceptance rule for hypnotically-aided testi-
mony, the Court remarked in A Juvenile that it had applied the rule in 
previous cases, for example on the use of spectrography37 polygraphy. 38 The 
Court also noted that it previously had criticized the rule39 and that the rule, 
which deals with the admissibility of expert testimony based on the applica-
tion of scientific principles, may not apply to hypnosis. 40 Nonetheless, the 
Court concluded that some form of the Frye standard may be considered in 
future cases addressing hypnotically-aided testimony. 41 
Having reviewed cases in other jurisdictions, the Court concluded that 
the ultimate question raised by hypnotically-aided testimony is whether the 
process is so suggestive as to preclude reliability. 42 In this regard, the Court 
observed that there may be no procedures that would prevent such testi-
mony from being tainted. 43 The Court remarked that even if there were no 
such procedures, the evidence might still be admitted as a discretionary mat-
volved were unduly suggestive; and (2) whether the identification was reliable under the totality 
of the circumstances. /d. at 198-200. 
" 173 N.J. Super. at 369, 414 A.2d at 309. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2325, 412 N.E.2d at 343. 
" Spectrography is the science of voice identification based on "voice prints" recorded on 
so-called spectrograms. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 196, 327 N.E.2d 671, 
677-78 (1975). 
" The polygraph, or "lie detector," is a machine that measures a subject's physiological 
responses to questions asked by a polygraph examiner. On the basis of these responses, poly-
graph experts claim to be able to tell whether the subject was lying or telling the truth when 
answering the questions. See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2603, 2609-17, 
381 N.E.2d 582, 586-89 (1978). 
•• In Commonwealth v. Vitello, the Court made the following observation: 
McCormick maintains that '[g]eneral scientific acceptance is a proper condition for tak-
ing judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibili~y of scientific 
evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness 
should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, probative 
value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, 
and undue consumption of time.' (Footnotes omitted). 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2623 n.l7, 381 N.E.2d at 592 n.l7 (1978). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2324, 412 N.E.2d at 342-43. 
41 /d. 
•• /d. at 2325, 412 N.E.2d at 343 . 
• , /d. 
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ter, and its reliability could be challenged before the jury. 44 The Court con-
cluded that further findings would be necessary concerning the general 
reliability of hypnotically-aided testimony and on the reliability of the pro-
cedures used in the particular case. 45 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in A Juvenile leaves many ques-
tions unanswered-especially whether the Court will allow hypnotically-
aided testimony by a prosecution witness in future cases. While the Court 
pinpointed one of the gravest dangers of using such testimony-its inherent 
suggestiveness-the opinion indicates that the Court will use a method 
similar to the approach it adopted for admissibility of polygraph results. In 
Commonwealth v. Vitello 46 the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the 
results of polygraph tests are admissible at the discretion of the trial judge if 
sufficient reliability is established, and that such results would be admitted 
only for the limited purposes of corroborating or impeaching the defend-
ant's testimony. 47 Similarly, in A Juvenile, the Court appears to accept the 
notion that if reliability is established, a jury may consider the use of 
pretrial hypnosis of a witness as a factor in assessing credibility. Thus, the 
reliability of the hypnotic procedures used in a particular case would be a 
matter for judicial discretion, and the hypnotically-aided nature of the 
testimony would affect only credibility. 
In A Juvenile, the Court cited a number of cases that took the "credi-
bility" approach, noting Harding v. State48 as the leading case.' 9 In Har-
ding, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the 
testimony of a prosecution witness who had been placed under hypnosis to 
restore her lost memory was admissible. so The witness in question was the 
victim of the defendant's alleged attack. 51 The court admitted the 
evidence. 52 In doing so, the court found three factors persuasive: (1) the 
hypnosis procedure used was fully exposed in the evidence; (2) the person 
who conducted the session was a qualified expert in the field; and (3) there 
was sufficient independent corroboration of the witness' testimony. 53 Har-
ding makes a strong statement for allowing the use of hypnosis to go to 
credibility rather than admissibility. Nonetheless, the Harding court also 
noted the current controversy among experts concerning the use of hypnosis 
" /d. at 2325-26, 412 N.E.2d at 343. 
" /d. at 2326, 412 N.E.2d at 344. 
•• 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2603, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978). 
'' /d. at 2635-39, 381 N.E.2d at 597-99. 
•• 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2321, 412 N.E.2d at 341. 
'
0 5 Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. 
" Id. at 233-34, 246 A.2d at 306. 
" /d. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. 
" /d. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312. 
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in the courtroom. 54 Those authorities, the court observed, warn that ''fancy 
can be mingled with fact in some cases."" Thus, in Harding, the court was 
aware of the shortcomings of hypnosis as a forensic tool. That court con-
cluded, however, that the safeguards used in the procedure, and the suffi-
ciency of the corroborating evidence, outweighed the possible pitfalls of 
using hypnotically-aided testimony. 56 
In A Juvenile, the Supreme Judicial Court took an approach similar to 
that used by the Harding court. The Court's apparent inclination to accept 
this "credibility" standard is disturbing. For example, this approach would 
rely heavily on the effectiveness of limiting instructions to the jury in order 
to prevent the jury from placing undue weight on the testimony of a witness 
whose recollection has been refreshed through hypnosis. While this ap-
proach might be viable in circumstances where a jury can rely on common 
knowledge or on experts in settled areas of scientific endeavor, such as 
medicine or ballistics, the reliability of hypnosis as a forensic tool is far 
from settled." In fact, authorities in the field are themselves wary of the 
legal community's use of hypnosis to develop testimony." The use of 
cumbersome procedures and limiting instructions to the jury to justify ad-
" /d. at 246, 246 A.2d at 311-12. 
" /d. 
•• /d. at 246-47, 246 A.2d at 311-12. 
" In State v. Harris, the Oregon court affirmed a trial judge's refusal to admit a defendant's 
pretrial hypnotically-aided statements. In barring this evidence, the judge had expressly men-
tioned the futility of limiting instructions to the jury with respect to the hypnotic evidence. 241 
Or. 224, 240-42, 405 P.2d 492, 499-500 (1965). 
" One authority has stated: 
It is extremely difficult to know which aspects of hypnotically-aided recall are 
historically accurate and which aspects have been confabulated. The details of material 
that are confabulated depend upon the subject's total past experience and all available 
cues relevant to the hypnotic task. Subjects will use prior information and cues in an in-
consistent and unpredictable fashion; in some instances, such information is incor-
porated in what is confabulated, while in others the hypnotic recall may be virtually 
unaffected. 
Orne, Martin T., M.D., The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. OF CLINICAL 
AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 317-18 (1979). 
In 1978, the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis adopted a resolution in 
response to the increasing use of hypnosis in criminal investigations. That resolution states, in 
part: 
Because we recognize that hypnotically-aided recall may produce either accurate 
memories, or at times may facilitate the creation of pseudo-memories, or fantasies that 
are accepted as real by subject and hypnotist alike, we are deeply troubled by the utiliza-
tion of this technique among the police. It must be emphasized that there is no known 
way of distinguishing with certainty between actual recall aad pseudo-memories except 
by independent verification ... [P]olice officers understandably have strong views as to 
who is likely to be guilty of a crime and may easily inadvertently bias the hypnotized 
subject's memories even without themselves being aware of their actions. 
27 INT'L J. OF CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 452 (1979). 
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mission of hypnotically-aided recall obscures the basic issue of the inherent 
suggestiveness and unreliability of hypnosis for evidentiary purposes. 59 As a 
practical matter, the hypnotic procedure, as it has been applied in criminal 
prosecutions, is often conducted under the supervision of a police in-
vestigatory unit. The possibility for bias in this context is a stark reality. 60 
Another disturbing feature of the Court's discussion of hypnotically-
aided testimony is its apparent failure to give weight to due process 
arguments. The Court noted that some courts have approached this issue by 
applying principles developed in Simmons v. United States61 and United 
States v. Wade. 62 These cases raised the question of safeguards for pretrial 
identification procedures. In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court 
held, inter alia, that pretrial identification procedures should be conducted 
so as to avoid impermissible suggestiveness. 63 In Wade, the Court stressed 
that in-court identification of witnesses must have an independent origin. 64 
The Supreme Judicial Court in A Juvenile, however, noted that the con-
cerns raised by the suggestiveness of pretrial identification procedures may 
not be relevant in determining the admissibility of hypnotically-aided testi-
mony. 65 Although the two situations may not be identical, the Court's 
distinction between them is unconvincing. Indeed, the witness whose 
" In A Juvenile the Supreme Judicial Court noted the procedural safeguards suggested by 
Dr. Martin Orne in State v. Hurd: 
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist 
trained in the use of hypnosis. 
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session should be independent of 
and not responsible to the prosecutor, investigator or the defense. 
(3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel prior to the 
hypnotic session must be in written form so that subsequently the extent of the informa-
tion the subject received from the hypnotist may be determined. 
(4) Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a de-
tailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them, carefully avoiding adding 
any new elements to the witness' description of the events. 
(5) All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be recorded so that a per-
manent record is available for comparison and study to establish that the witness has 
not received information or suggestion which might later be reported as having been 
first described by the subject during hypnosis. Videotape should be employed if possi-
ble, but should not be mandatory. 
(6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the hyp-
notic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and post-hypnotic interview. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2324-25 n.S, 412 N.E.2d at 343 (citing 173 N.J. Super. at 362-63,414 
A.2d at 306). 
•• See notes 58-59 supra. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2325-26 n.10, 412 N.E.2d at 343 n.10 (citing 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)). 
62 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2325-26 n.10 (citing 388 U.S. 218,241 (1967)). See note 33 supra. 
63 388 U.S. at 342. 
•• 390 U.S. at 384. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2325, 412 N.E.2d at 343. See note 33 supra. 
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memory has been revived through hypnosis during a pretrial identification 
proceeding is the same witness whose hypnotically-aided testimony is used 
to convict the defendant. Although the Court did not ignore these consid-
erations in A Juvenile, 66 the thrust of the opinion appears to be more 
directed at finding an appropriate procedure to counterbalance the defects 
of hypnosis, rather than examining due process consideratio~s. 
While the Court's inadequate attention to the suggestiveness and general 
unreliability of hypnosis as a forensic tool, and the attendant constitutional 
concerns appear to be the primary shortcomings of the Court's approach, 
other more practical problems are raised by the decision. For example, if 
the Court imposes safeguards similar to those proposed in Hurd, 67 cumber-
some procedures to ensure the accuracy of such testimony will arise. 
Although such considerations may not at first seem as serious as those bear-
ing more directly on constitutional protections, they surely will need to be 
resolved if the Court decides to follow the lead of Harding v. State and 
other decisions that have allowed the use of hypnosis to affect credibility 
but not admissibility. 
The significance of A Juvenile for the practitioner is twofold. First, the 
case indicates that the question of admissibility of hypnotically-aided testi-
mony in criminal trials is still open. Therefore, the defense attorney wishing 
to have such evidence excluded should raise the issue at a pretl,"ial motion to 
suppress. Second, such a motion can attack admissibility of hypnotically-
aided testimony on two grounds: (1) the inherent suggestiveness of the pro-
cedure generally, and (2) the procedures followed in the particular case. 
Statements by experts in the field of medicine who question the advisability 
of using such evidence in the courtroom would support the defense at-
torney's position. In addition, although the Court stated in A Juvenile that 
due process considerations may play an insignificant role in deciding ad-
missibility of hypnotically-aided testimony, the issue should still be raised. 
In addressing due process considerations, the Court's own concern that no 
procedural safeguards may suffice to counter the shortcomings of such 
evidence could undermine its reluctance to exclude it. 
•• The Court acknowledged that a witness' confidence in his testimony and his willingness to 
fill in missing elements may be affected by hypnosis. Such an alteration of memory, the Court 
observed, arguably presents the constitutional question of whether the use of hypnotically-
aided testimony denies a defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. The Court 
noted further that "[s]uch alteration might also be characterized as the destruction of ex-
culpatory evidence. Moreover, the unavailability of a record of the circumstances during the 
surrounding the hypnotic procedure might be termed a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence 
or a denial of the effective assistance of counsel." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2326 n.ll, 412 
N.E.2d at 344 n.11. The Court's detailed consideration of procedural safeguards inA Juvenile, 
however, indicates that the Court may consider such safeguards adequate to counterbalance 
these constitutional considerations. 
67 See note 59 supra. 
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§ 1.4. Jury Instructions-Shifting of Burden of Proof.* In Sandstrom 
v. Montana, 1 the United States Supreme Court held that a judge's instruc-
tions in a homicide case may pot create a presumption against the defend-
ants on the issue of intent. 2 The Sandstrom Court found that instructions 
creating such presumptions violated the defendant's fourteenth amendment 
rights. 3 During the Survey year, there were four cases decided by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in which a criminal defendant 
challenged a judge's instructions to the jury on grounds similar to those suc-
cessfully raised by the defendant in Sandstrom. In two of these cases the 
Court upheld the original verdicts, but in the other two it reversed convic-
tions on the basis of improper instructing. Nevertheless, the decisions 
followed a generally consistent pattern. 
In the first of these four cases, Commonwealth· v. Medina, 4 the two 
defendants were found guilty of first and second degree murder, respective-
ly, in the brutal slaying of the latter's former mistress. s Subsequently, one 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming errors in the trial judge's 
instructions on malice. 6 The most substantial ground for appeal concerned 
the judge's references to a "presumption" of malice automatically arising 
from an unlawful killing.' The defendant argued that the judge's instruc-
t~on may have shifted impermissibly the burden of proof on the issue of 
malice from the commonwealth to the defendant. 8 
In ruling on this claim, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial 
court judge's use of the word "presumption," while "regrettable, " 9 did not 
shift the burden of proof onto the defendant. 10 The Court found it signifi-
cant that, in the same sentence that he referred to "presumption," the trial 
judge properly instructed that malice may be inferred only from the circum-
stances present in the case. 11 In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court noted 
that the trial judge dwelt on the meaning of "inference" and its applicabil-
ity to the instant case. 12 Accordingly, the Court decided that the trial judge 
compensated sufficiently for any erroneous reference to a presumption. The 
Medina Court found further support for its decision from a Mass~chusetts 
*By William A. Fragetta, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSEITS LAW. 
§ 1.4 I 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
' Id. at 519. 
3 /d. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1143, 404 N.E.2d 1228. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1143, 404 N.E.2d at 1230. 
• /d. at 1154, 404 N.E.2d at 1235. 
' /d. at 1154-55, 404 N.E.2d at 1235-36 . 
• /d. 
' /d. at 1155, 404 N.E.2d at 1236. 
•• Id. at 1156, 404 N.E.2d at 1236. 
" Id. at 1155-56, 404 N.E.2d at 1236. 
12 /d. 
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case, Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 13 decided before the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Sandstrom. In Mcinerney, the words ''presump-
tion" and "inference" had been used interchangeably in the jury charges. 14 
Despite the errors in the charges, the Mcinerney Court decided that the in-
structions as a whole had described accurately the commonwealth's burden 
of proving malice." Consequently, the Mcinerney Court declined to reverse 
the defendant's conviction. 16 Similarly, because the jury chargesin Medina 
had explained the commonwealth's burden sufficiently, one slight error was 
held insufficient to overturn the defendant's conviction. 17 
In contrast, a defendant's conviction was overturned because of im-
proper jury instructions in Commonwealth v. Callahan, 18 decided three 
months after Medina. In Callahan, the Court found that the jury instruc-
tions impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 19 At trial, 
Callahan was convicted of first degree murder. 20 When he appealed to the 
Supreme Judicial Court, the Court found no error in the appeal points 
raised by the defendant. 21 On its own initiative, however, th'e Court re-
viewed the entire record and found error in the trial judge's jury instruc-
tions. 22 
The trial judge in Callahan had correctly defined malice for the jury but 
also had explained that a presumption of malice necessarily arises from the 
intentional use of a deadly weapon. 23 The Supreme Judicial Court found 
this mandatory presumption impermissible in light of previous Supreme 
Court and Massachusetts decisions. 24 In addition, the Court took exception 
to the judge's reference to the "principle that a person must be presumed to 
intend to do that which he voluntarily and willfully does in fact do and that 
he must intend all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his own 
act. " 25 The Court reasoned that although malice may indeed be inferred 
from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, 26 these instructions imper-
" 373 Mass. 136, 365 N.E.2d 815 (1977). 
1
• /d. at 141, 365 N.E.2d at 818. 
" /d. 
16 /d. 
17 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1156, 404 N.E.2d at 1236. The Court did grant this defendant a 
new trial, however, based on certain questionable testimony and potential prejudice because of 
his connection at trial with defendant Medina. ld. at 1159-60, 404 N.E.2d at 1238. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1411, 406 N.E.2d 385. 
" /d. at 1412, 406 N.E.2d at 386. 
20 /d. at 1411, 406 N.E.2d at 385-86. 
21 /d. 
22 /d . 
., /d. at 1412-13, 406 N.E.2d at 386 . 
.. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 
352 N.E.2d 203 (1976). 
2
' Commonwealth v. Callahan, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1413, 406 N.E.2d at 386. 
26 Commonwealth v. Campbell, 375 Mass. 308, 312,, 376 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1978). 
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missibly created a presumption of malice. 27 The Court ruled that the 
language of the charge shifted at least part of the burden of proving malice 
onto the defendant. 28 This shift runs counter to the constitutional mandate 
that the commonwealth prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 29 
The Callahan Court encountered little difficulty in distinguishing 
Medina. It characterized the judge's incorrect statements in Medina as an 
"occasionallapse"30 into the mistaken use of the word "presumption." It 
found the Medina instructions in toto, however, to be careful and 
thorough, while the judge's charge at Callahan's trial did not rise to that 
level. 31 While the Medina Court deemed a single use of the word "presump-
tion" to be "regrettable"32 but acceptable, the judge at Callahan's trial had 
used "presumption" or some form of that word six times, and "inference" 
not at all. 33 Because the trial judge in Callahan clearly defined ''presump-
tion" to the jury as having a mandatory effect, the substitution of words 
forced the defense to rebut the "presumption" of malice defined as in-
herent in the defendant's acts. 34 Because such a charge violated Callahan's 
fourteenth amendment rights, the Court overturned his conviction. 3 ' 
The Court employed the same approach in a comparable case, DeJoin-
ville v. Commonwealth, 36 later in the Survey year. The DeJoinville case in-
volved a set of jury instructions similar to those in Callahan. A jury of the 
superior court had convicted Dennis DeJoinville of arson and second degree 
murder in his uncle's death by fire. 37 DeJoinville petitioned for a writ of er-
ror relating to that portion of the superior court judge's charge dealing with 
intent. 38 
As in Callahan, the trial judge in DeJoinville had charged the jury that an 
individual was presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his 
voluntary acts. 39 DeJoinville asserted two grounds on which these instruc-
tions could be found to have unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof 
from the prosecution to the defense. The first ground was that the jury may 
27 Commonwealth v. Callahan, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1414,406 N.E.2d at 387. The Court 
stressed that "the word 'presumption' was defined as having a mandatory effect, while 'in-
ferences' were described as permissibly drawn from the facts proved." /d. 
" Id. at 1415, 406 N.E.2d at 387. 




2 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1155, 404 N.E.2d at 1236. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1414, 406 N.E.2d at 387. 
,. ld. at 1415, 406 N.E.2d at 388. 
" /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1797, 408 N.E.2d 1353. 
" /d. at 1797, 408 N.E.2d at 1353-54. 
" /d. at 1798-99, 408 N.E.2d at 1353-54. 
" Id. at 1798, 408 N.E.2d at 1354. 
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have viewed the charge as creating a conclusive presumption that the 
defendant possessed the intent necessary to support a verdict of guilty of 
second degree murder. 40 If there were a conclusive presumption, no 
evidence or testimony which the defense might introduce could rebut the 
presumption. 41 The alternate ground claimed by DeJoinville was that the 
judge's remarks had created a mandatory presumption in the minds of the 
jury, 42 which, while potentially rebuttable, would still wrongly shift the 
burden. 43 
The Court did not find that the trial judge's charge had created a con-
clusive presumption of intent in this case. It agreed, however, with the 
defendant's claim that the jury reasonably could have interpreted the charge 
as creating a rebuttable presumption of intent. 44 The Court found support 
for this conclusion in much of the language of the judge's charge. 45 The 
judge had noted, in reference to his charge on intent, that the mandatory 
presumption was a "general rule" that had "repeatedly been applied and to 
a great variety of cases. " 46 This statement differentiated the instructions 
from those in Medina, in which the mention of "presumption" had been 
more of an isolated instance, and had not been an emphasized section of the 
judge's charge. Accordingly, the DeJoinville Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction. 
The Court's decisions in DeJoinville and Callahan remain consistent with 
its Medina ruling, while at the same time they accurately and effectively ap-
ply the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Sandstrom. In both 
Callahan and DeJoinville, the trial judge had made his discussion of 
presumption of malice a major part of the overall charge. The trial judge in 
Callahan clearly delineated the differences between an inference and a 
presumption of malice and then referred explicitly to presumption as arising 
from the intentional use of a deadly weapon. 47 The trial judge in DeJoinville 
had gone so far as to characterize his mistaken explanation of presumption 
as a well-settled principle of law. 48 Thus, the Court was well within the 
boundaries set out in Sandstrom in deciding that there could have existed in 
the minds of the jury an unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof. 
Consequently, the Court was correct in overturning these defendants' con-
" /d. at 1799-1800,408 N.E.2d at 1355. The Court based its ideas on "conclusive presump-
tion" upon the rules set out in Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and United 
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
41 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 522. 
" DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1803, 408 N.E.2d at 1357. 
" Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 524. 
44 DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1805, 408 N.E.2d at 1358. 
" /d. at 1798 n.1, 408 N.E.2d at 1354 n.l. 
•• /d. at 1805, 408 N.E.2d at 1358 . 
., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1414, 406 N.E.2d at 387. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1805, 408 N.E.2d at 1358. 
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victions. Another case in the Survey year, however, was to demonstrate that 
the Supreme Judicial Court had not embraced a more liberal standard for 
reversal than the one it set out in Medina. 
In Commonwealth v. Repoza, 49 which came before the Court only four 
months after DeJoinville, the defendant had been indicted for first degree 
murder in regard to a stabbing death. 50 The victim had received his wounds 
in the aftermath of a fight in which Repoza allegedly had delivered the fatal 
blow. 51 A jury in the superior court had found the defendant guilty of first 
degree murder. 52 On appeal, Repoza attacked the superior court pro-
ceedings on various grounds, including a claim that the trial judge had erred 
seriously in his instructions to the jury on the element of malice needed to 
support a murder conviction. 53 
In the trial judge's charge to the jury on malice, he twice mentioned a 
"presumption" of malice arising from the intentional use of a deadly 
weapon. 54 The Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that these instruc-
tions were "incorrect," 55 but the Court did not agree that the instructions 
demonstrated a sufficient shifting of the burden to the defendant to require 
reversal. 56 The Court found the situation in Repoza more analogous to that 
in Medina than to those in Callahan and DeJoinville. As in Medina, the 
Repoza trial judge had compensated for his erroneous references to 
"presumed" intent by "his repeated and careful instructions reinforcing the 
principle that the burden of proof on every essential element of the crime in-
variably remains with the Commonwealth. " 57 Thus, the Court distin-
guished the Repoza case from Callahan and DeJoinville, because the incor-
rect reference to presumption did not permeate the entire charge. 58 The trial 
judge in Repoza "left no doubt" that the commonwealth was obligated to 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 59 Therefore, reversible error was 
avoided in Repoza, as "the charge, read as a whole, ma[de] clear the Com-
monwealth's burden.'' 60 
The Court's ruling in Repoza is consistent with its previous decisions con-
cerning a judge's instructions on intent. Although the mistaken reference by 
the trial judge in Repoza may have been more misleading than the reference 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2499, 414 N.E.2d 591. 
•• /d. at 2499, 414 N.E.2d at 592. 
" Id. at 2502, 414 N.E.2d at 594. 
" Id. at 2499, 414 N.E.2d at 592. 
" ld. at 2512, 414 N.E.2d at 599. 
" /d. 
" ld. 
,. Id. at 2515, 414 N.E.2d at 601. 
" Id. at 2514, 414 N.E.2d at 600 . 
.. ld. 
" Id. at 2515, 414 N.E.2d at 600. 
•• Commonwealth v. Medina, 1980 ¥ass. Adv. Sh. at 1155, 404 N.E.2d at 1236. 
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in controversy in Medina, in both cases the judge gave a lucid general 
charge on the necessary elements of the offense in question. 61 The Court 
deemed this general charge to outweigh any individual mistakes in word 
usage that the judge may have made at some point in the charge. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has, then, by four decisions during the 
Survey year, recognized that in certain cases a judge's instructions to the 
jury can result in an unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof onto 
the defendant. The Medina and Repoza cases, however, indicate that the 
Court will not overturn a conviction on the basis of a trial judge's isolated 
errors in using the word "presumption" in place of "inference" in his jury 
instructions on intent and malice. The Callahan and DeJoinville decisions, 
conversely, demonstrate that the Court will reverse a guilty verdict if a 
judge's complete instructions on intent or malice could give the jury an in-
correct understanding of the commonwealth's burden. Despite a trial 
judge's misstatement, the Court will not find such error to be reversible, 
provided that the charge clearly demonstrates the commonwealth's burden. 
The standard developed by the Court is a most appropriate one. In ascer-
taining that the judge's instructions have not shifted the burden of proof, it 
remains true to the Sandstrom decision. At the same time, by examining a 
trial judge's alleged misstatements in the context of the complete charge, the 
Court avoids having to reverse valid convictions on the basis of harmless 
judicial error. Therefore, the Court's standard neatly accommodates both 
constitutional and practical considerations. 
•• Interestingly, in both Medina and Repoza, the Court, at the outset of the opinions, 
discussed the factual background of the case at great length and described the violent deaths of 
the victims in some detail. In Callahan and DeJoinville, however, the relevant crimes are 
described only briefly if at all. This may indicate that, when presented with a particularly sor-
did crime and a substantial body of evidence incriminating the defendant, the Court may be 
somewhat reluctant to reverse an otherwise valid conviction on the basis of a partially mistaken 
charge by the trial judge. 
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